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I. INTRODUCTION
Although there is no prohibition against a solo practitioner
selling the physical assets of her law practice, such as the books,
typewriters, or lease, commentators agree that she cannot sell her
practice as a going concern.1 The solo practitioner cannot profit
*Professor of Law, University of Nebraska; B.A., Harvard University, 1964; J.D.,
Harvard University, 1967; L.L.M., Harvard University, 1974.
1. See H.S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 161 (1953); Cantor, The Value of a Lawyer's Inter-
est in His Practice, 43 N.Y.S. B.J. 47 (1971); Katten, Sale of a Law Practice-Federal Tax
and Ethical Aspects, 54 ILL. B.J. 686 (1966); McCarthy, Termination of a Law Practice, 54
Wis. B. BULL. 51 (1981); Minkus, The Sale of a Law Practice: Toward a Professionally
Responsible Approach, 12 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 353, 356 (1982); Sterrett, The Sale of a
Law Practice, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 306 (1972); Thurm, Disposal of an Attorney's Practice, 59
A.B.A.J. 68 (1973); Note, The Death of a Lawyer, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 606, 611, 614 (1956).
This article will not address the problems associated with the sale of a law practice by a
solo practitioner's estate. These problems are to some extent different from the problems
associated with the sale of a law practice by a retiring lawyer. See Minkus, supra note 1, at
369-73; Note, supra note 1.
Moreover, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct provide that:
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a non-lawyer, except that:
(2) a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of
a deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that
proportion of the total compensation which fairly represents the ser-
vices rendered by the deceased lawyer . ...
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from the likelihood that her clients will continue to patronize a
lawyer she recommends them.2 She cannot capitalize on the good-
will of her business.' This distinguishes her from other business-
persons, other professionals, such as doctors,4 English solicitors,5
and, most unfairly, from partners in American law firms.6 The sub-
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(a) (1983); accord MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-102(A) (1979); see infra notes 19-20. Most goodwill purchases
involve some form of shared fee dependent on factors other than services rendered. There-
fore, to permit a purchase of a deceased lawyer's practice would probably involve an amend-
ment to either the Model Code or the Model Rules. The point of this article is that the
Model Rules, without further amendment, permit the sale of a law practice by a solo
practitioner.
2. One commentator has suggested that solo practitioners should enter into a "mutual
cooperative association" to solve this problem. Dimitrous, A Solo Practitioner's Partnership
Agreements, 56 WIs. B. BULL. 16 (1983).
3. There is no single definition of goodwill. In a sense, it is the not otherwise identifi-
able advantages related to a going concern. In 1810, Lord Eldon stated: "The good-will,
which has been the subject of sale, is nothing more than the probability, that the old cus-
tomers will resort to the old place." Crutwell v. Lye, 34 Eng. Rep. 129, 134 (Ch. 1810). In
1926, Justice Cardozo, in In re Brown, 242 N.Y. 1, 150 N.E. 581 (1926), wrote: "Men will
pay for any privilege that gives a reasonable expectancy of preference in the race of compe-
tition. Such expectancy may come from succession in place or name or otherwise to a busi-
ness that has won the favor of its customers. It is then known as good will." Id. at 6, 150
N.E. at 582 (citation omitted).
4. See Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983); Tessmar v. Grosner, 23 N.J. 193,
128 A.2d 467 (1957).
5. See Cantor, supra note 1, at 47-48 (examining buying and selling practices in Eng-
land); see also Bunn v. Guy, 102 Eng. Rep. 803 (KB 1803) (upholding attorney's sale of his
practice where attorney received consideration in return for his recommending clients to two
other attorneys); Candler v. Candler, 37 Eng. Rep. 834 (Ch. 1821) (upholding attorney's
payment of profits from his practice to non-attorney); G. GRAHAM-GREENE, CORDERY'S LAW
RELATING TO SOLICITORS 311 (7th ed. 1981) (discussing solicitors ability to capitalize on the
goodwill of their practice).
6. Prior to 1971, there was some ambiguity with respect to whether a firm could share
subsequently-earned fees with a retired partner. Canon 34 of the prior Model Code pro-
vided: "No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based
upon a division of service or responsibility." In 1971, the Committee on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility (hereinafter the Committee) held in Formal Op. 327 (1971) that Canon
34 permitted payment to a retired partner out of the firm's future earnings. The Committee
allowed compensation in spite of the fact that this constituted a fee-splitting arrangement.
The Committee resolved past ambiguities by stating that it was "permissible to make pay-
ments to a retired partner . . . in accordance with a pre-existing retirement plan, the
amount of those payments being measured by subsequent earnings of the firm." Id. This
holding is equivalent to permitting the retired partner to be paid for his interest in the
firm's goodwill. The Model Code incorporates the Committee's opinion and provides: "This
Disciplinary Rule [related to fee-splitting] does not prohibit payment to a former partner or
associate pursuant to a separation or retirement agreement." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107(B) (1969). There is no similar provision in the Model Rules. Ap-
parently, the drafters believed that a retired partner was by definition a firm member. Rule
5.4(a)(1) of the Model Rules, which is substantially identical to DR 3-102(A)(1) makes this
clear, and provides:
(A) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a non-lawyer, except that:
[Vol. 39:471
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stantive law and the canons of ethics permit partners to sell their
businesses as going concerns, thereby realizing some value for their
goodwill.
For example, Lawyer S, a solo practitioner, has a thriving
practice. She wishes to retire. As a means of assisting her clients
with this change, as well as a means of making a profit for herself,
she arranges to sell her practice to Lawyer B. She believes B to be
capable and competent. S agrees with B to write her clients, advis-
ing them that she is retiring, and that she recommends that they
continue their business with B. S also agrees to discontinue her
local law practice and not to compete with B in the future. B
agrees to pay S a percentage of his gross revenues during the next
five years. The arrangement could be advantageous for all. Never-
theless, commentators conclude that such an arrangement is
impermissible.7
Yet, on the other hand, the consequences may be wholly dif-
ferent where S and B are partners practicing as "S & B," and at
S's retirement, S agrees to discontinue her law practice and not to
compete with B in the future. As in the prior hypothetical, S and B
may write S's clients, recommending that they continue their rela-
tionship with B. The practice may continue under the name of "S
& B." B may agree to pay S a percentage of his future revenues
over the next few years. Because this retirement benefit is related
to future revenues, it is a way of paying S for her share of the
business as a going concern. Unlike the prior hypothetical, com-
mentators approve of this arrangement allowing S to capitalize on
her goodwill.8
Understandably, commentators have disagreed on the desira-
bility of this distinction between solo practitioners and partners.
(1) an agreement by a lawyer with his firm, partner, or associate may provide for
the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after his death, to his
estate or to one or more specified persons.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(a)(1) (1983) (footnotes omitted). If there
could be such payments to the partner's estate, a fortiori, there could be such payment to
the retired partner.
In his article, Sterrett critiques the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Re-
sponsibility, Formal Op. 327 (1971). Sterrett, supra note 1, at 322-23. This Opinion is the
root of the comparison problem because it allows the retired partner to capitalize on her
goodwill. This article accepts the Opinion and argues that the Committee should treat solo
practitioners similar to retiring partners.
7. Other commentators give different and more complex examples. See Minkus, supra
note 1, at 353-54; Thurm, supra note 1, at 48. The principle, however, is the same.
8. See supra note 6; Sterrett, supra note 1, at 306-08.
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One commentator, however, has justified the distinction." Mr. Ster-
rett argues that in a "true" partnership there would be little
chance that S, one partner, would refer her clients to an incapable
and incompetent partner. He believes that partners choose others
as partners because of their legal talents and would not recom-
mend other partners to clients for extraneous reasons, such as the
amount of a retiring partner's promised benefits. Nevertheless, the
author concedes that there is potential for abuse in the "quickie"
partnership situation, in which S and B join together for the pur-
pose of transferring S's business. He warns that courts and disci-
plinary authorities should be vigilant in preventing this abuse. The
author, however, offers no way of distinguishing a "true" from a
"quickie" partnership.10 Another commentator advocates a more
permissive approach to the sale of a solo practitioner's law prac-
tice." Professor Minkus suggests an amendment to the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code) that would allow
the sale of an individual practice if there is adequate disclosure to
clients and the clients consent. 2
Authorities draw support for their conclusion that a solo prac-
titioner cannot sell the non-physical aspects of her law practice
from an opinion of the New York County Lawyer's Association's
Committee on Professional Ethics: "Clients are not merchandise.
Lawyers are not tradesmen. They have nothing to sell but personal
9. Sterrett, supra note 1.
10. Id. at 321-23.
11. Minkus, supra note 1.
12. Id.; see The Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct of the
State Bar of California, Report and Recommendations Concerning Proposed New Rule 2-
112 (April 30, 1982). The proposed rule stated:
Rule 2.112. Sale or Purchase of a Law Practice
(A) A law practice of a member or a deceased member of the State Bar or a law
firm, including consideration for good will, may be sold to or purchased by an-
other member of the State Bar or law firm. The total fee charged to clients shall
not be increased solely by reason of the payment of consideration for the good
will or other tangible assets of the practice.
(B) If the sale will involve the transfer of responsibility for the work on behalf of
the seller's clients, then notice pursuant to the provisions of this rule must be
given. In all other sales and purchases, notice pursuant to the provisions of this
rule may be given.
(C) The seller must notify clients in writing that an interest in the law practice
is being sold to the purchaser and that the clients have the right to retain other
counsel and to take possession of their files. This notification must comply with
the provisions of rule 2-101(A)-(6), Rules of Professional Conduct, and the seller
must disclose any conflict of interest.
(D) The purchaser shall take reasonable steps to assure that the seller has com-
plied with subdivision (C) of this rule.
[Vol. 39:471
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service. An attempt, therefore, to barter in clients, would appear to
be inconsistent with the best concepts of our professional status.' 3
In a later Opinion, the American Bar Association Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility (Committee) concluded:
"The practice of law is not a business which can be bought or
sold.
1 4
As a statement of fact, the suggestion that there is nothing of
value to be bought and sold contradicts reality. Lawyers regularly
speak of their clients as belonging to them, and when moving from
firm to firm, they usually take their clients with them. Even the
IRS has recognized that there can be goodwill associated with a
solo law practice.15 Recently, several cases have held that in the
context of marital dissolution disputes, there is definitely some-
thing of value associated with a law practice as a going concern. 6
The probability of client loyalty establishes the value of the prac-
tice.17 The simple fact that lawyers are willing to pay for this po-
tential suggests that such value exists.
The Committee's statements lack logic. To state that the sale
of a law practice is "inconsistent with the best concepts of our pro-
fessional status" or that a law practice is "a business which
can[not] be bought or sold," begs the question. Why is it inconsis-
tent? Why is it a business that cannot be bought or sold? What
interests or persons might be harmed if lawyers bought and sold
solo law practices? Such statements reflect only the belief that
sales of individual practices are undignified and overly commercial.
Prohibiting the sale of the intangible assets of a solo law prac-
tice, including goodwill, has unfortunate consequences. Frequently,
there is valuable goodwill incident to a solo law practice. Thus,
lawyers, through two common methods, will attempt to circumvent
13. New York County Lawyer's Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 109 (1943),
quoted in ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 266 (1945).
With the exception of the language quoted from Opinion 109, this article will only cite ABA
Committee opinions. Not only are they more available than state ethics committee opinions,
but they are also the products of a more authoritative body. See Finman & Schneyer, The
Role of Bar Association Ethics Opinions in Regulating Lawyer Conduct: A Critique of the
Work of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 29 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 67 (1981).
14. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 300 (1961).
15. See Comment, Law Firms: Selected Partnership Tax Problems of Formation and
Admission of New Partners, 59 NEB. L. REV. 679 (1980).
16. See Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983); In re Freedman, 35 Wash.
App. 49, 665 P.2d 902 (1983).
17. The Dugan court made it clear that this value was different from a professional
degree and future earning capacity.
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the law prohibiting its transfer. First, the buyer may pretend to
purchase only the seller's physical assets. The buyer pays an en-
hanced amount for those assets, because the transfer secretly in-
cludes the transfer of goodwill. Second, the buyer and seller may
enter into a partnership. Several months later, the seller will retire.
The buyer, or successor partner, is left with the business as a going
concern. This is the "quickie" partnership method. The end result
of both of these methods is that lawyers resort to misrepresenta-
tion and deception in order to realize the goodwill incident to a
solo law practice.
Concerned with her financial security upon retirement, a solo
practitioner may feel compelled to enter into a partnership agree-
ment. There is no correlation, however, between a particular form
of business organization and quality lawyer services. In some situa-
tions, a solo practitioner may provide better service than a part-
nership could provide. Thus, policies favoring a particular form of
business organization over another are unwise and inefficient.
Clients tend to return business to a lawyer because she pro-
vides good service. The law ought to encourage and reward this
kind of service. One effective way would be to permit the solo law-
yer who provides it, and therefore achieves the promise of return
business, the opportunity to gain as a result. Not to permit her to
sell her practice may give her less incentive to provide the service
in the first instance. Moreover, if the retiring lawyer is unable to
sell the practice, she will have no economic incentive to guard her
clients' interests on her retirement. She may leave them with little
more than a good-bye notice.
The argument against allowing the sale of a law practice in-
cludes the charge that the seller may violate several duties that she
owes her present clients as well as potential future clients. 18 First,
the seller may breach her duty not to disclose her clients' confi-
dences and secrets. Second, she may breach her duty to give an
objective referral, untainted by a conflict of interest. Third, she
may make herself unavailable for future service. She may improp-
erly withdraw from her professional obligations, and as a result of
a convenant not to compete, unduly restrict others from subse-
quently choosing her as their attorney.
Critics also have charged that the buyer may violate several
duties. First, the buyer not only may be soliciting clients but he
18. Of course, the seller and buyer act in concert. The analysis of the problem is easier
to understand, however, if we focus on seller and buyer separately.
[Vol. 39:471
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also may be paying the seller to refer these clients to him. Second,
the buyer may be jeopardizing his loyalty to his new clients. He
might be tempted to provide either a low-quality service or a too
costly service to his clients in order to compensate for the price
paid to the seller. Third, the buyer may mislead the client with
respect to the nature of his law practice by the use of the seller's
office, telephone number, or trade name.
The conclusion that a solo practitioner should not be able to
sell her law practice as a going concern, however, does not with-
stand close scrutiny. This is especially true in light of the Ameri-
can Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model
Rules).' 9 Subject to intense professional and public debate during
the last few years, the Model Rules were designed to replace the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility.2 0 This article maintains
that the Model Rules, more clearly than the Model Code, reflect a
set of values that suggest that, under certain conditions, a solo
practitioner should be able to sell her practice. The fact that the
Model Rules reflect important developments in constitutional law
supports this suggestion.
A retiring solo practitioner ought to be able to sell her law
practice, including its goodwill, to a qualified lawyer. This will dis-
courage deception, permit lawyers to use an appropriate form of
business organization, and encourage lawyers to provide good ser-
vice to their clients and to consider client interests on retirement.
A reasonable sales agreement ought to be both enforceable and
ethical.
The sales agreement should provide that: (1) the buyer pay
the seller either a sum certain for the business or an amount con-
tingent on revenues over a period of years; (2) the seller write her
clients, advise each of them that she is selling her business to the
buyer, and disclose the fact and method of payment; (3) the seller
communicate that, although each client has the right to withdraw
his business and take back his files, she recommends that they con-
tinue their legal business with the buyer; (4) the seller request per-
mission to transfer the clients' files to the buyer in a reasonable
19. The American Bar Association, after intensive scrutiny and numerous drafts,
adopted the Model Rules in August, 1983 and recommended that the states adopt the rules.
20. The American Bar Association adopted the Model Code in 1969, and most states
have used it as a Model Code of Ethics. It is organized into nine Canons or axiomatic princi-
ples. Under each Canon, there are Ethical Considerations [hereinafter EC] that serve as
aspirational statements; there are also Disciplinary Rules [hereinafter DR], that are man-
dated rules.
1985]
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period of time; (5) the seller may agree to a reasonable covenant
not to compete; (6) the seller must include in her letter to clients
that she will be legally responsible, as if she were a partner of the
buyer, for all the buyer's acts and omissions related to all client
cases that the seller, if she had not retired, would have been obli-
gated to finish; and (7) the buyer may use any indicia of the seller's
business, such as the same office, the same telephone, even the
same name, as long as such use is not misleading or deceptive.
This article first will examine the primary authority that sup-
ports the proposition that a solo practitioner cannot sell the good-
will in her law practice and will show that this authority is sparse.
It then will examine the alleged problems, focusing first on the
seller and then on the buyer. It will scrutinize the relevant values,
examine the new Model Rules, and make reference, where appro-
priate, to constitutional developments.
II. PRIMARY AUTHORITY
Despite many commentators' assertions that a solo practi-
tioner cannot sell the goodwill associated with a law practice, there
is little primary authority to support this position. Neither the
Model Code nor the Model Rules expressly prohibits the sale of a
law practice. The Model Code does, however, implicitly prohibit
such a sale. Ethical Consideration 4-6 provides: "Thus a lawyer
should not attempt to sell a law practice as a going business be-
cause, among other reasons, to do so would involve the disclosure
of confidences and secrets."21 The Model Rules make no reference
to the sale of a law practice.
The leading authority on the sale of a law practice is the ABA
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Opinion 266. Although it dealt with the sale of a law practice by an
21. The Model Code provides:
The obligation of a lawyer to preserve the confidence and secrets of his client
continues after the termination of his employment. Thus, a lawyer should not
attempt to sell a law practice as a going business because, among other reasons,
to do so would involve the disclosure of confidences and secrets. A lawyer should
also provide for the protection of the confidences and secrets of his client follow-
ing the termination of the practice of the lawyer, whether termination is due to
death, disability, or retirement. For example, a lawyer might provide for the per-
sonal papers of the client to be returned to him and for the papers of the lawyer
to be delivered to another lawyer or to be destroyed. In determining the method
of disposition, the instruments and wishes of the client should be a dominant
consideration.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-6 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 39:471
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estate, its dicta makes it relevant to a retiring lawyer's sale. The
Committee, in dicta, questioned the ethical propriety of purchasing
the practice and goodwill of a deceased attorney from the heirs or
personal representatives, whether by payment of a lump sum or by
an agreement to pay a stated percentage of the future receipts,
gross or net, from his clients.22 The Committee, citing Opinion 109
of the Committee on Professional Ethics of the New York County
Lawyers' Association, stated that such a transaction was
improper.2 s
The Committee focused first on Canon 34. At the time, it read:
"'No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with an-
other lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility.' -124
The Committee concluded that the described arrangement would
be an impermissible division of legal fees with a layperson (the es-
tate). The Committee added, by way of dictum, that even if the
transaction were with a lawyer, it would violate Canon 34 because
the fee division would not be in proportion to the respective law-
yers' work or responsibility.
25
The Committee briefly asserted there might be an improper
disclosure of client confidences, thus violating Canon 37.21 The
Committee did no more than briefly assert this point; as shown
below, this is not an important reason for the outright proscription
of a sale.
The Committee next opined that a sale would result in unwar-
ranted client solicitation in violation of Canon 27.27 The Commit-
tee recognized that there are two types of activities prohibited by
Canon 27. It noted that a lawyer is prohibited from "soliciting by
arrangement with the estate of a deceased lawyer the latter's cli-
ents to continue their business with him. ' 28 The Committee also
observed that a lawyer is precluded from "permitting the widow or
heirs of the deceased to urge such clients to continue their business
22. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 266 (1945).
23. Id.
24. Id. (quoting Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 34 (1928) (amended 1933)). The
Model Code replaced the American Bar Association's Canons of Ethics that were adopted in
1908.
25. Id. The Committee apparently assumed that the described transaction involved
splitting legal fees. This results when a payment schedule is based on future fees. If, how-
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with him."29 Such activities would give an advantage to the highest
bidder for the practice, which should not be the basis for retaining
an attorney. 80
There are few reported cases disciplining attorneys for the
purchase or sale of a law practice. This lack of authority demon-
strates that perhaps the courts tacitly condone the practice, or that
the common modes of transfer (inflating the value of the physical
assets and entering into a "quickie" partnership arrangement) are
so common that cases do not arise. Some precedent does exist,
however. In a pair of companion cases, the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin censured both the buyer and seller of a law practice.3 1 The
court's principal concern was the misrepresentation associated
with the transfer. The buyer represented himself as a partner of
the seller, and he kept the name of the partnership after the seller
left. The court also concluded that the seller violated his duty to
keep his clients' confidence, as well as his duty not to withdraw
improperly from his representation.
3 2
The non-disciplinary cases fall into two categories. First, there
are those cases in which the buyer is suing to enforce a covenant
not to compete. Second, there are those cases in which the seller is
suing to receive his payment or the buyer is suing to have his obli-




31. In re Campbell, 113 Wis. 2d 715, 335 N.W.2d 881 (1983); In re Disciplinary Pro-
ceedings Against Laubenheimer, 113 Wis. 2d 680, 335 N.W.2d 624 (1983).
32. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Laubenheimer, 113 Wis. 2d 680, 335 N.W.2d
624 (1983). The court in Laubenheimer did not focus on the fee-splitting problem. Instead,
the court disagreed with the referee's finding that there was impermissible fee-splitting and
concluded that the method used was only a means to pay for the practice.
33. Although authorities frequently cite partnership dissolution cases for the proposi-
tion that a solo practitioner cannot sell her goodwill, this article will only briefly mention
partnership dissolution cases in which the sale of the goodwill of a going concern was con-
tested. In fact, the courts have, on occasion, stated that a law partnership has no goodwill to
divide.
These cases can be viewed in three ways. First, there are cases that state the "no good
will proposition" by way of dictum. See Little v. Caldwell, 101 Cal. 553, 36 P. 107 (1894);
Heywood v. Sooy, 45 Cal. App. 2d 423, 114 P.2d 361 (1941).
Second are those cases, such as Lyon v. Lyon, 246 Cal. App. 2d 519, 54 Cal. Rptr. 829
(1966), that find, as a matter of fact, that for the particular partnership there is no goodwill.
The Lyon court demonstrated that the law firm in question was really several independent
lawyers, each with their own client base. Therefore, there was no goodwill to divide. The
court wrote:
The manner in which the law practice of Lyon & Lyon was carried on by the
partners reflects the highly personal and confidential nature of the relationship
of each individual partner and the client-for whom he did legal business and to
whom the client looked for legal services and responsibility. The great majority
[Vol. 39:471
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Although there are no cases in which a court has refused to
enforce a reasonable covenant not to compete pursuant to the sale
of a law practice, there are several cases in which the courts have
enforced such covenants.3 " Most recently, in Hicklin v. O'Brien,85
the court found that the seller's agreement not to practice in a sin-
gle county was a reasonable restriction. The court noted that the
seller had drafted the agreement, that it was fair and equitable at
the time the seller drafted it, and that it did not impose any hard-
ship on the seller.3" This analysis conformed with prior case law.
Even though the court recognized the argument that the agree-
ment required the defendant to engage in unethical practices, it
found no constitutional provisions, statutes, or judicial decisions
that would make the contract illegal. Furthermore, the court found
that it was unnecessary to determine whether the contract violated
canons of professional ethics.
3 7
Several older cases either denied the seller the right to enforce
the buyer's promise to pay or allowed the buyer to void his agree-
ment.38 These cases, however, are weak authority for the general
proposition that a solo practitioner cannot sell her law practice as
of clients who came to Lyon & Lyon came to the individual partner; the individ-
ual partner took care of the work and was responsible for it and maintained the
account. In answer to the court's question concerning his opinion of the value of
the good will of Lyon & Lyon on January 8, 1962, defendant Leonard S. Lyon,
Jr., testified that the value was "nothing"; "that the good will in the sense that it
can be subject to a valuation does not exist and by the nature of a law partner-
ship cannot exist, because such good will as attaches to a legal partnership, at-
taches to the individuals as such, and if you apply the good will to the partner-
ship itself, what you are doing is applying an aggregate of good wills."
Id. at 523-24, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
Third are those cased that state that a retired partner cannot receive an accounting for
future fees and earnings of the partnership attributable to the goodwill of the law firm be-
cause this involves the unethical fee-splitting arrangement discussed in Canon 34. See Mof-
fatt v. Cresap, 33 A.D.2d 54, 304 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1969), afl'd, 29 N.Y.2d 856, 277 N.E.2d 926,
328 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1971); Siddall v. Keating, 8 A.D.2d 44, 185 N.Y.S.2d 630, aff'd, 7 N.Y.2d
846, 164 N.E.2d 860, 196 N.Y.S.2d 986 (1959). Recent interpretations of Canon 34 and sub-
sequent Model Code changes, however, severely undermine these cases. See supra note 6.
34. See Thorn v. Dinsmoor, 104 Kan. 275, 178 P. 445 (1919); Heinz v. Roberts, 135 Iowa
748, 110 N.W. 1034 (1907); Smalley v. Greene, 52 Iowa 241, 3 N.W. 78 (1879).
35. 11 111. App. 2d 541, 138 N.E.2d 47 (1956). Contra Dwyer v. Jung, 133 N.J. Super.
343, 336 A.2d 498 (Ch. Div.), aff'd, 137 N.J. Super. 135, 348 A.2d 208 (App. Div. 1975),
criticized in Note, Attorneys-Professional Responsibility-Restrictive Cove-
nants-Attorney Must Not Enter Into Partnership Agreement Prohibiting Themselves
from Representing Former Clients Upon Termination of the Partnership, 4 FORDHAM URa.
L.J. 195 (1975).
36. Hicklin, 11 111. App. 2d at 550, 138 N.E.2d at 52.
37. Id. at 550, 138 N.E.2d at 52.
38. See authorities cited infra note 39-51 and accompanying text.
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a going concern. These older cases fall into two categories: cases in
which too little was transferred and those in which too much was
transferred.
First, there are cases in which the court believed the seller's
promised referral was so valueless that there was no consideration,
and therefore no enforceable contract. In Ryman v. Kennedy,39 the
court permitted the buyer of a law practice from an estate to set
aside her promissory note because the sale of the attorney's good-
will was not adequate consideration to support the contract. The
court said that "the possibility that after his death his clients
would consent to the selection of other counsel by the executors or
others is too remote a contingency to render the 'good will' of the
testator a subject-matter of sale." '
There are also cases in which too much was transferred. In
Smalley v. Greene,4' the seller attempted to assign the contracts of
employment. This goes beyond the case in which the buyer bar-
gains only for a referral. A forced assignment is improper because
it imposes a new lawyer on a client without the client's prior
consent.
Two cases in the last decade deserve closer scrutiny. In Geffen
v. Moss, 42 two attorneys explicitly agreed that the sale of the
seller's physical assets did not include the goodwill of the business.
Nevertheless, they agreed that the seller would "exert his influence
for the continued welfare of the practice and to encourage present
and former clients to utilize the legal services of the office in the
future."43 The court found that both buyer and seller "considered
the expectation of future business from present clients and former
clients as a principal motivating factor in this transaction."4 4 The
court correctly believed there was an attempted transfer of good-
will. Therefore, when the buyer refused to pay the agreed-upon
consideration, the court refused to permit the seller to sue for
damages.
Although Geffen seems to hold that a solo practitioner cannot
sell her goodwill, there is an alternative interpretation of the case.
As previously noted, the seller agreed to exert his influence to per-
39. 141 Ga. 75, 80 S.E. 551 (1913); accord In re Estate of Martin, 178 Misc. 43, 33
N.Y.S.2d 81 (Surr. Ct. 1941).
40. Ryman, 141 Ga. at 76, 80 S.E. at 552.
41. 52 Iowa 241, 3 N.W. 78 (1879).
42. 53 Cal. App. 3d 215, 125 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1975).
43. Id. at 219, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
44. Id. at 222, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 690-91.
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suade his clients to retain the buyer. The court found "that the
expected business from former and current clients of the plaintiff
did not materialize" and that the seller "ha[d] received the fair
value for the physical assets transferred pursuant to the agree-
ment. 14 5 A reasonable interpretation of the opinion is that a pre-
condition of payment was the effectiveness of the referral and, be-
cause it was ineffective in this case, the seller could not sue.
Because the seller had received fair value for physical assets trans-
ferred, it would be unjust enrichment to let him recover additional
payments.
In Koehler v. Wales,"' the plaintiff attorney planned to be out
of the country for fourteen months. She entered into an agreement
whereby the defendant would assume her law practice for that
time. Defendant was entitled to 85% and plaintiff 15% of the rev-
enues of new cases. This arrangement was similar to a temporary
sale of a law practice.
Much of the Koehler court's discussion suggested that it
would not object to the sale of a law practice. The abandonment of
clients or the sharing of confidential information did not trouble
the court-if an attorney has to be absent from her practice be-
cause of an illness or a vacation, she has to do what is necessary to
protect the immediate interests of the clients. The court could
have extended this reasoning to equate retirement with an illness
or vacation that necessitates the sale of the practice.4 7
The Koehler court also seemed to recognize the inherent value
of a law practice as a going concern. 8 It noted that the transferring
lawyer wanted to preserve her business. The court observed that
there was nothing wrong with this because the practice was of
value and deserved to be protected.49 This is analogous to the situ-
ation in which the seller wants to convey the intact law practice to
a buyer.
Despite this analysis which supported the arrangement and
the sale of a law practice, the court assumed that a solo practi-
tioner cannot sell the goodwill connected with her business.50 It
concluded that to permit the seller to recover the agreed-upon per-
45. Id. at 221, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
46. 16 Wash. App. 304, 556 P.2d 233 (1976).
47. Id. at 307-08, 556 P.2d at 236. The court noted that clients are not merchandise and
that the relationship between attorney and client is confidential. Because neither party in-
tended to violate these principles, there was not breach of duty. Id. at 308, 556 P.2d at 236.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 311, 556 P.2d at 238.
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centage of revenues of business begun during her absence and not
completed by the buyer until after she returned would be an im-
permissible transfer of goodwill is under the authority of Geffen."1
Nevertheless, in affirming the trial judge's award for damages
under the business interference theory, the court allowed the
equivalent of recovery under a sale of goodwill theory. The court,
in effect, returned to its initial instincts and permitted the transfer
of goodwill.
There is little primary authority to support the proposition
that a solo practitioner cannot sell the goodwill associated with her
law practice. There are a few cases and they are inconclusive.
Neither the Model Rules nor the Model Code explicitly prohibits
such a sale.
The 1945 Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibil-
ity reported that the sale of a law practice would breach client con-
fidences, result in unwarranted client solicitation, and constitute
an impermissible division of legal fees. Disfavor expressed forty
years ago, however, should not preclude a contemporary examina-
tion of these concerns. The Model Rules, recently adopted by the
American Bar Association (ABA), offer a framework in which the
sale of a law practice can be executed without violating ethical
standards. Both the seller and the buyer can take steps to. assure
that these concerns are met.
III. THE SELLER
A. Disclosure of Confidences
A client legitimately expects that his lawyer will keep his files
and relevant information confidential and not disclose them with-
out prior consent. In Formal Opinion 266 the Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility asserted that selling a law practice
might jeopardize this confidentiality interest.52 Ethical Considera-
tion 4-6 restates this position." The Model Rules, however, make
no explicit reference to the sale of a law practice. Any conclusion
that the Model Rules restrict the sale of a law practice must be
madeby inference. At a minimum, the Model Rules are less re-
51. Id. at 311-12, 556 P.2d at 238.
52. The Committee stated: "Canon 37 provides: 'It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve
his client's confidences. This duty outlasts the lawyer's employment. Every lawyer's files
contain confidential information from clients which neither he nor his heirs or personal rep-
resentatives may properly disclose without the client's express permission.'" ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 266 (1967).
53. See supra note 21.
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strictive than the Model Code.
There are two phases in the sale of a law practice: first, the
negotiations with respect to the transfer; second, the actual trans-
fer of the business. The risks of an unwarranted disclosure of in-
formation during either phase are very slight.
During the negotiation phase, the buyer will want to know the
status of the entire practice that he is acquiring. How else would
he know how much to pay? The important information will be ag-
gregate in nature. The buyer may want to see financial statements
and generalized statements about the make-up of the seller's prac-
tice, but the buyer will have no legitimate reason to want to delve
into particular case files during this stage. Disclosure of this gen-
eral financial information would not jeopardize any particular cli-
ent's confidences, because clients could reasonably expect lawyers




One analogy to the sale of a practice is the situation in which
an attorney approaches a bank for bookkeeping services or to bor-
row money for her business. Ethical Consideration 4-3 states that
''a lawyer [may] give limited information from his files to an
outside agency necessary for . . . banking . . . purposes, provided
he exercises due care in the selection of the agency and warns the
agency that the information must be kept confidential."55 In Infor-
mal Opinion 1364, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility noted that this information could include client
names, financial information, and even information involving work
performed. 6 In that opinion, although the Committee focused on
the fact that clients expect law firms to use the outside agencies, it
suggested that clients anticipate that their lawyer will reveal cer-
tain information in order to run his practice.
Information useful to the buyer has also been readily available
in the cases of publicly funded law firms, such as public defender
54. One commentator believes that even to disclose this aggregate information would
violate the lawyer's duty. Minkus, supra note 1, at 378.
55. The Model Code provides:
Unless the client otherwise directs, it is not improper for a lawyer to give
limited information from his files to an outside agency necessary for statistical,
bookkeeping, accounting, data processing, banking, printing, or other legitimate
purposes, provided he exercises due care in the selection of the agency and
warns the agency that the information must be kept confidential.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-3 (1969).
56. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1364 (1976)
(This Opinion reconsidered and withdrew Informal Op. 1267 (1973).).
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offices and legal aid offices. Because these institutions are account-
able to the public, disclosure of the operation of their business is
necessary so that the public can determine whether they are doing
their jobs properly, and whether they are worth the amount of
money spent on them. In Formal Opinion 334, the Committee ex-
amined the kind of information legal aid offices can disclose.
There, the Committee expressed a concern for a client's confi-
dences and secrets;17 it was reluctant to give the board of directors
of a legal services office access to particular files of particular cli-
ents. Although legal services offices might disclose certain informa-
tion if needed to assure the board that its policies were correctly
followed, the Committee still insisted that the office reveal confi-
dential information only with client consent. In Informal Opinion
1443, the Committee observed, however, that the board could re-
quire a legal services office to prepare audited financial reports for
public scrutiny.55 Because such information is general in nature,
disclosure did not jeopardize the legitimate interests of particular
clients. Similarly, the selling lawyer's clients would have no inter-
est in preventing her from disclosing general financial information
to a potential buyer.
During the second transfer phase, the risks of unwarranted
disclosure are less. The seller should not transfer files without the
fully informed consent of the client.59 The selling lawyer should
write her clients in advance of retirement to seek permission to
transfer her files to the purchaser of the practice. This rule is
designed to protect client confidences and should be applied to in-
active and active files. After advising her clients of her impending
retirement, it is unlikely that the selling lawyer will encounter
much difficulty in seeking permission to transfer the files.
To permit candidly the sale of a law practices will avoid the
unwarranted disclosure invited by current practices. Under current
practices, the seller enters into a partnership with the buyer. Ethi-
cal Consideration 4-2 provides: "Unless the client otherwise di-
rects, a lawyer may disclose the affairs of his client to partners or
associates of his firm." 0 When the seller retires a few months after
57. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 334 (1974).
58. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1443 (1979).
59. One commentator has suggested that if the seller must transfer the files, they
should be sealed until the client gives consent. Sterrett, supra note 1, at 312-13. The court
in Koehler v. Wales, 16 Wash. App. 304, 556 P.2d 233 (1976) showed little concern over
disclosures made with no consent.
60. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-2 (1969).
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the sale, the buyer will therefore have access to the files.
The rationale behind allowing partners to share information
among themselves is that clients expect it. It is unlikely that cli-
ents would expect a lawyer who has long been in solo practice to
share client information with another lawyer. If they expected any-
thing at all, it would be that she would retire at some point in
time. Allowing the disclosure of client information without client
consent, merely because of compliance with the formalities of a
partnership, clearly violates the spirit and substance of the confi-
dentiality principle in the sale of a law practice. In other words,
prohibition of the sale of a law practice based on the confidential-
ity rationale only makes matters worse. Sellers would resort to
practices that lead to unexpected disclosures of confidential client
information anyway. Furthermore, the clients are deprived of the
opportunity to object to the new representation. On the other
hand, such an opportunity would be available if the selling lawyer
had given appropriate notice of her retirement to her clients and
explained to them their right to reclaim their files and decline rep-
resentation by her successor.
The threat of an unwarranted disclosure of confidential infor-
mation in the sale of a law practice is slight. In the negotiation
phase, there is no reason to disclose confidential information. The
disclosure of information necessary to the sale will not violate any
particular client's confidences and secrets. In the actual transfer
phase, the risks of unwarranted disclosure are less because nothing
will be conveyed without client consent. Allowing the solo practi-
tioner to sell her law practice, provided she obtains client consent
to the actual transfer of the files, will better protect client confi-
dences than allowing unanticipated disclosure to "quickie"
partners."
B. Objectivity of Referral
One way of characterizing the sale of a law practice is that the
buyer, in one way or another, is paying the seller to recommend
the buyer's services. The seller's recommendation may therefore be
suspect. Characterized this way, and under certain sales arrange-
ments, there arguably may be several violations of the Model Code
and the Model Rules. Disciplinary Rule 2-103(B) and Rule 7.2(c)
prohibit a lawyer from giving anything of value to a person to rec-
61. See, e.g., Minkus, supra note 1, at 360 (clients may not think that a partner will
share any information).
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ommend his employment; 2 DR 5-101(A) and Rule 1.7(b) prohibit
a lawyer from accepting employment if his own financial or per-
sonal interest may affect his professional judgment; 3 and DR 2-
107(A) and Rule 1.5(e) prohibit the sharing by lawyers of a single
legal fee. 4 The major concern underlying these rules is the poten-
62. The Model Code provides:
A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or or-
ganization to recommend or secure his employment by a client, or as a reward
for having made a recommendation resulting in his employment by a client, ex-
cept that he may pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by any of
the organizations listed in DR 2-103(D).
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(B) (1969) (footnotes omitted).
Similarly, the Model Rules provide:
A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the
lawyer's services, except that a lawyer may pay the reasonable cost of advertising
or written communication permitted by this rule and may pay the usual charges
of not-for-profit lawyer referral service or other legal service organization.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.2(c) (1983).
63. The Model Code provides: "Except with the consent of his client after full disclos-
ure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on
behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial business,
property, or personal interests." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(A)
(1969) (footnote omitted).
Similarly, the Model Rules provide:
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to
a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation
of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation
shall include explanation of the implications of the common repre-
sentation and the advantages and risks involved.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1983).
64. The Model Code provides:
(A) A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another lawyer who is
not a partner in or associate of his law firm or law office, unless:
(1) The client consents to employment of the other lawyer after
a full disclosure that a division of fees will be made.
(2) The division is made in proportion to the services performed
and responsibility assumed by each.
(3) The total fee of the lawyers does not clearly exceed reasona-
ble compensation for all legal services they rendered the client.
(B) This Disciplinary Rule does not prohibit payment to a former partner or
associate pursuant to a separation or retirement agreement.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107 (1969) (footnotes omitted).
Similarly, the Model Rules provide:
A division of fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made
only if:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by
each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer
assumes joint responsibility for the representation;
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tial unreliability of the seller's referral.
Because all lawyers are licensed and therefore presumed com-
petent to practice law, one commentator has argued that there
cannot be a referral inconsistent with the client's best interest.6 5
This position is unrealistic. Lawyers vary in quality, and in some
cases a referring lawyer may be tempted to recommend a less qual-
ified or even unqualified lawyer. The temptation may vary with the
circumstances of the sale.
If the purchase is for a specific sum, the seller will have less
reason to care about the buyer's competency than if the payments
are related to the buyer's future revenues. Most purchase agree-
ments, however, will be tied to future revenues. It would be a rare
buyer who would be willing to spend much for the referral without
demonstration of its success. Lawyer referrals are highly uncertain
in that there is no guarantee that a client will continue his business
with the buyer. Because a dissatisfied client will result in smaller
payment to the seller, the normal economics of the transaction
suggest that the seller will exercise considerable care in selecting a
buyer.
To minimize further the risks of referrals to incompetent law-
yers, the seller should disclose to her clients that the buyer is pay-
ing her to make the referral and that she will remain legally liable,
as if she were a partner of the buyer, for all current cases. These
requirements enhance client protection by making the client aware
of one of the reasons for the referral and encouraging the seller to
screen potential purchasers to make certain that they would not
burden her with vicarious liability. These are the implied assur-
ances clients receive when they engage a law firm. Partners refer
cases to each other and they, including retired partners, split the
legal fees. Although the client is not necessarily told of the split
fees, it is assumed that he consents to the arrangement. Each part-
ner remains vicariously liable for the work of his colleagues.6
The paradigm for this suggested approach is Model Rule
1.5(e), which permits a fee-split if "the client is advised of and
(2) the client is advised of and does not object to the participa-
tion of all the lawyers involved; and
(3) the total fee is reasonable.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e) (1983).
65. Cantor, The Value of a Lawyer's Interest in His Practice, 43 N.Y. ST. B.J. 47
(1971). But see Sterrett, supra note 1, at 311.
66. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 13 (1968). It is arguable that the client also gets the
screening and consideration that comes from choosing partners in long-standing relation-
ships. The difficulty with this is that not all partnerships are long-standing relationships.
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does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved"
and "each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the
representation." '67
Disclosure to the client is the easiest way of assuring that fi-
nancial considerations do not taint the referral. Of course, the
temptation remains but so do the legitimate reasons for making
the referral. At the very least, it shows respect for the client to let
him make an informed choice. Further, the Model Code suggests
informed consent as a safeguard. Both DR 5-101(A),6" which pro-
hibits a lawyer from taking employment if a financial interest
would affect her judgment, and DR 2-107(A),"9 which prohibits
fee-splitting, could be avoided if the client consents to the arrange-
ment after full disclosure.
The Model Rules also adopt, and extend, the informed con-
sent solution. Model Rule 1.7(b) provides that if the lawyer's own
interests affect her judgment, it may nevertheless be appropriate
to represent the client if there is client consent after consultation.7°
Model Rule 1.5(e) provides that lawyers can split fees if "the client
is advised of and does not object to the participation of all the
lawyers involved." 7' This language suggests that a client who pas-
sively acquiesces in the fee-split, as clients of a partnership do, will
be deemed to have consented to it. This is more permissive than
the Model Code and reflects an effort to approach the sale of a law
practice as if it were a partnership.72
The client need not rely only upon his own informed judg-
ment. To encourage the seller to screen potential buyers as if they
were potential partners, the seller ought to be liable for the buyer's
errors in judgment. This liability should be both direct and vicari-
ous. First, the seller will be directly liable if she makes a negligent
referral or negligently selects a buyer.7 3 This is analogous to a fidu-
ciary duty not to negligently sell a controlling interest in a corpora-
67. See supra note 64.
68. See supra note 63.
69. See supra note 64.
70. See supra note 63.
71. See supra note 64.
72. The Model Rules provide that a lawyer may "pay the usual charges of a not-for-
profit lawyer referral service." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.2(c) (1979).
This is more permissive than the Model Code and reflects an awareness that where there is
no temptation on the part of the referring lawyer, payments should be allowed.
73. See MALLEN & LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 220 (1977); see also Tormo v. Yormark,
398 F. Supp. 1159 (D.N.J. 1975) (attorney transferring case to out-of-state attorney may be
negligent for failing to check on progress of case).
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tion to a looter.74 The seller owes a duty to her clients at least to
make minimal checks with respect to the integrity and competence
of the buyer. Second, the seller ought to be vicariously liable for
the current cases as if she were a partner of the buyer.75 This too
will encourage her to exercise due care in choosing a buyer for her
business.
Disciplinary Rule 2-107(A)(2) provides that two lawyers may
divide a fee for legal services if the division is made in proportion
to the services performed and responsibility assumed by each. 7, Al-
though authorities have been clear as to the meaning of services,
they have been unclear as to the meaning of responsibility. 77 Most
agreed that a mere referral was not "responsibility" as defined in
the Model Code.78 The origins and purpose of allowing propor-
tional fee-splitting were also unclear. 7
e
The Model Rules clarify the meaning of responsibility and the
purpose of the provision better than previous authority. As before,
lawyers can divide fees if the division is in proportion to the ser-
vices performed by each lawyer. The Model Rules further provide
that fees can be split if, "by written agreement with the client,
each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation. '8 0
The purpose of the Model Rules is to allow the referring law-
yer to split a fee if she continues to be responsible for the matter
as if she were a partner of the lawyer to whom the client is re-
ferred.8 1 Partners do not necessarily work on the same case. A cli-
ent may actually contact one partner, only to have that lawyer re-
fer the case to his partner. Yet, the partners can split fees. What
the client gets is ultimate responsibility, that is, legal liability,
from the first partner. The client thus has reason to believe that
74. See Minkus, supra note 2, at 364; Sterrett, supra note 1, at 309.
75. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 13 (1968).
76. See supra note 64. Ethics committee opinions and court opinions rarely review the
exact proportion of services and fees divided. As long as each attorney provides some of the
services, the committees and courts take a permissive attitude. See Hall & Levy, Intra-
Attorney Fee Sharing Arrangements, 11 VAL. UL. REV. 1 (1976).
77. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 204
(1940).
78. See A Panel Discussion The Determination of Professional Fees From the Ethical
Viewpoint, 7 U. FLA. L. REV. 433, 434 (1954).
79. As suggested in Corti v. Fleisher, 93 Ill. App. 3d 517, 523-24, 417 N.E.2d 764, 770
(1981), the responsibility provision served as a method of protecting clients. A lawyer doing
work or assuming responsibility would be paid for his efforts, and therefore a client could
rely on the lawyer to do competent work. Several purposes for the rule are articulated in
Hall & Levy, supra note 76, at 25-26.
80. See supra note 65.
81. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e) (Discussion Draft 1980).
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the partner will monitor his other partners. The Model Rules are
designed to encourage the referring lawyer to use care in choosing
her temporary partners. A client should get the same care from a
lawyer who sells her business.
How extensive should the seller's assumption of responsibility
be? If the seller of a law practice receives a percentage of the
buyer's gross revenue over several years, the payment can be char-
acterized as a fee-split with respect to: (1) the seller's clients on
matters that the seller is obligated to complete;8 2 (2) the seller's
clients on new matters, initiated with the buyer; and (3) clients
who had no contact with the seller who initiate matter with the
buyer. The seller's assumed responsibility should be no more ex-
tensive than if the seller were a retired partner. This would limit
the assumed liability to only the first category. To require greater
responsibility would be unfair to the seller, might result in the cli-
ent's improper perception of the guarantee as a reason in itself for
retaining the buyer, and would be unnecessary to assure adequate
screening of buyers.
The selling lawyer should remain responsible for active cases.
The seller is obligated to her clients because they expected her to
do the work. The general principle applicable to the legal profes-
sion is that the obligated lawyer cannot delegate her responsibility
to another lawyer.83 Similarly, a retiring partner cannot delegate
her liability. As to matters a law firm is obligated to complete, a
retired partner in a firm properly remains liable for acts or omis-
sions of partners after his retirement. 84 Further, the partnership is
obligated to complete existing work, and even thought it may take
several years, the partnership owes the client the same legal pro-
tection he had when the matter began.
The leading case is Redman v. Walters.5 In 1969, Redman re-
tained MacDonald, Brunsell & Walters to institute a lawsuit. After
the trial court dismissed his suit in 1974 for want of prosecution,
Redman was able to bring a malpractice action against Walters de-
spite the fact that in 1970 Walters had withdrawn from the firm
and had never had any contact with Redman. Redman's dealings
82. See Heywood v. Sooy, 45 Cal. App. 2d 423, 114 P.2d 361 (1941).
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 17-18 (1938).
84. See CRANE & BROMBERG, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 445 (1968).
85. 88 Cal. App. 3d 448, 152 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1979); see also Blackmon v. Hale, 1 Cal. 3d
548, 463 P.2d 418, 83 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1970) (partner of attorney misappropriating clients'
funds held liable because of lack of evidence that the attorney did not act as a member of
the firm).
[Vol. 39:471
SALE OF A LAW PRACTICE
had been with Brunsell. The court observed that the partnership
was merely winding up its business with respect to active cases,
and therefore, without an express release, all partners were respon-
sible for completing the work. 6 To avoid the confusion that the
results might cause in different jurisdictions, the seller ought to
advise her clients she will remain legally responsible for these cases
as if she were the buyer's partner.87
In spite of the literal language in the Model Rules, which calls
for joint responsibility in the case of a fee-split, the seller of a law
practice should not be legally responsible for clients contacting the
buyer for the first time after the sale. First, this absolute responsi-
bility would make the seller a guarantor of so much of the buyer's
business that it would be impossible for the seller to anticipate her
potential liability. Second, it would make the seller more responsi-
ble than a retired partner. The clients of a partnership who did not
rely on the reputation of a retired partner would have no claim
against the retired partner.8 Analogously, none of the buyer's fu-
ture clients would have relied, in any way, on the seller having sold
the business. Third, and most important, the seller is not referring
these cases. A purpose of the joint responsibility clause is to assure
that the referring lawyer uses care in her referrals. In the case of
the sale of a law practice, it is an implausible argument that the
seller has referred this category of cases to the buyer.
Those cases where the seller receives a fee-split on new cases
for existing clients are the most difficult. On the one hand, to re-
quire the seller to remain responsible will assure that the lawyer is
careful in choosing her buyer. On the other hand, this makes the
seller the guarantor of the buyer's business for several years. Not
only is there unlimited liability, but also there is no time limit to
such vulnerability. The seller will probably not be able to insure
herself against future contingencies. Further, the assumption of le-
gal responsibility may be an improper inducement to the client to
retain the buyer. Again, it is appropriate to hold the seller to the
86. Redman, 88 Cal. App. 3d at 454, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
87. But see Gibson v. Talley, 156 Ga. App. 593, 275 S.E.2d 154 (1980) (exception to rule
made because the partnership was dissolved when malpractice occurred); Collins v. Levine,
156 Ga. App. 502, 274 S.E.2d 841 (1980) (exception to rule where client had no contact with
other firm members).
88. See, e.g., Middleton v. Francis, 257 Ky. 42, 77 S.W.2d 425 (1934); Jewison v.
Dieudonne, 127 Minn. 163, 165, 149 N.W. 20, 23 (1914) (Bunn, J., dissenting); see also Unif.
Partnership Act, § 35 (1968) (concerning power of partner to bind partnership to third
person after dissolution); CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 66, at 464 (noting when a partner-
ship may be bound to a third party).
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same standard as if she were a retired partner. She would not be
liable, therefore, if clients received notice of her retirement before
initiating the new business." The clients would not have relied on
the lawyer's membership in the firm and the seller's notice of sale
would inform clients of her retirement. She therefore should be re-
lieved of any responsibility even if there is the fee-split. In the typ-
ical sale of a law practice, there will be enough potential liability
resulting from the first category of cases to assure that the seller
will use care in choosing her successor.
C. Availability for Future Work
When a lawyer retires, she withdraws from current matters,
and if allowed to sell her business, she will usually enter into a
reasonable covenant not to compete with the buyer, thus making
herself unavailable to some future clients. Courts and commenta-
tors have suggested that both the withdrawal and the noncompeti-
tive covenant are objectionable and a reason for denying solo prac-
titioners the right to sell their law practices.90
In anticipation of selling her practice, the seller may write her
clients advising them that she is going to retire and transfer her
business to the buyer. This will give the client the opportunity to
choose whomever he wishes as his next attorney. Under clear prin-
ciples of contract and agency law, the lawyer may not thereby re-
lieve herself of liability in cases that she is legally committed to
continue. Moreover, under the Model Code, it may also be a
breach of ethics to withdraw without good cause.91 Although the
authorities are not decisive, there is support for the notion that
because there is no requirement to take all cases presented to
them, lawyers must at least complete those that they do accept.9 2
From this perspective, a poorly drafted letter from the seller could
be perceived as an unwarranted and unprofessional withdrawal
rather than a proper step in assisting the client in finding a new
lawyer.
The Model Rules take a more relaxed approach, condoning a
lawyer's withdrawal from any case not pending before a tribunal as
long as there will be no material adverse effects on the interest of
89. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 35 (1968).
90. See In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Laubenheimer, 113 Wis. 2d 680, 335
N.W.2d 624 (1983); Sterrett, supra note 1, at 316.
91. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110 (1969).
92. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 legal background (Proposed
Final Draft 1981).
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the client. There is no "good cause" requirement. This shift does
not affect the law of contract and agency, but it removes any sug-
gestion that a lawyer can be compelled to work for a client even if
the client will not be injured. The Model Rules thus enhance the
lawyer's freedom. From this perspective, the seller's letter will not
be a troublesome withdrawal notice but may be seen as a means of
assuring that there will be material injury to the client on the
seller's retirement.
3
The retiring seller may also enter into a reasonable covenant
not to compete. If the buyer wants to assure future patronage by
the seller's clients, he needs some assurance that the seller will not
return to compete with him. As a result, the buyer quite predict-
ably will insist on a restrictive covenant either in terms of geogra-
phy, time, or clients. The common law has enforced such covenants
if they are reasonable. 4 The courts balance the interests of the
covenantor, the covenantee and the public to determine the rea-
sonableness of the restrictive covenant in each case.
Both the Model Code and the Model Rules prohibit post-em-
ployment, noncompetitive covenants per se.95 The argument is that
93. The Model Rules provide:
Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a
client if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the
interests of the client, or if:
(1) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's
services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;
(2) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime
or fraud;
(3) a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer
considers repugnant or imprudent;
(4) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the
lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable
warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is
fulfilled;
(5) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial
burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by
the client; or
(6) other good cause for withdrawal exists.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b) (1983).
94. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1979).
95. The Model Code provides: "A lawyer shall not be a party to or participate in a
partnership or employment agreement with another lawyer that restricts the right of a law-
yer to practice law after the termination of a relationship created by the agreement, except
as a condition to payment of retirement benefits." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY DR 2-108(A) (1969).
Similarly, the Model Rules provide: "A lawyer shall not participate in offering or mak-
ing: (a) a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the rights of a lawyer to prac-
tice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon
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the public's and the lawyer's interests always outweigh the inter-
ests of the covenantee-employer. Commentators have criticized
this result. 6 Regardless, it is important to note that neither the
Model Code nor the Model Rules specifically addresses a covenant
not to compete ancillary to the sale of a business. This is an impor-
tant distinction because courts have traditionally been more will-
ing to enforce covenants incident to the sale of a business than
mere post-employment covenants.17 Not only is the buyer's inter-
est in getting the benefit of his bargain substantial, the seller has
also evinced, by a willingness to sell her business, a disinterest in
continuing that particular practice. Moreover, although it is impor-
tant to allow clients to have the lawyer of their choice, neither the
Model Code nor the Model Rules requires a lawyer to work for any
client who wishes to retain his services.9 8 In a country with an
abundance of lawyers, it will not severely handicap any client to
preclude him from choosing an attorney who has willingly agreed
to a reasonable restrictive covenant incident to the sale of a
practice.
In addition, both the Model Code and the Model Rules recog-
nize an exception to the per se rule in the case of a covenant not to
compete related to the payment of a partner's retirement bene-
fits.9 In these cases, both permit a reasonable noncompetition cov-
enant. This is analogous to the sale of a business. The retiring
partner not only will be selling her practice to the remaining part-
ners but also her interest in the firm's goodwill. As is the case with
the buyers, the remaining partners will want assurances that they
are getting the benefit of their bargain. 100 This balance is the ap-
propriate one, and the per se rule as it relates to post-employment
covenants should not be extended to a per se approach to restric-
tive covenants ancillary to the sale of a business. There are no
cases or opinions, however, involving lawyers that explicitly pro-
retirement." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.6(a) (1983); see also Dwyer v.
Jung, 133 N.J. Super. 343, 336 A.2d 498 (Ch. Div.), afl'd, 137 N.J. Super. 135, 348 A.2d 208
(App. Div. 1975); Note, Attorneys-Professional Responsibility-Restrictive Cove-
nants-Attorney Must Not Enter Into Partnership Agreements Prohibiting Themselves
from Representing Former Clients Upon Termination of the Partnership, 4 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 195 (1976) (discussing restrictive covenants contained in partnership agreements).
"96. See Kalish, Covenants Not to Compete and the Legal Profession, 29 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 423 (1985).
97. See Blake, Employee Agreements not to Compete, 73 HARv. L. REV. 625, 646-48
(1960).
98. See Kalish, supra note 96.
99. See supra note 95.
100. See Gray v. Martin, 65 Or. App. 173, 663 P.2d 1285 (1983).
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hibit such reasonable restrictive covenants. 101
Although a client has the right not to be abandoned and a
right to choose the lawyer he wishes, these rights must be balanced
against an attorney's interest. The Model Rules clearly support the
notion that a lawyer should be able to resign from a matter if there
will be no material harm to the client. Accordingly, a letter of
withdrawal incident to a sale will not be an abandonment, but in-
stead will be an effort to assist the client. All things being equal, a
client should be able to retain any lawyer he wants. A balancing of
the interests suggests that this right ought not automatically offset
an attorney's right to sell her business and to enter into the cove-
nants necessary to effectuate the sale.
D. Summary
There are three sets of concerns associated with the seller of a
solo law practice. First, the seller may breach her duty to keep her
client's confidences. This is not a substantial concern as long as the
lawyer solicits client consent for the file transfer. Second, the seller
may be financially interested in her referral. Both the Model Code
and the Model Rules suggest disclosure of the fact and nature of
her interest, leaving it to the client to evaluate the choice. The
Model Rules, more clearly than the Model Code, also suggest that
if the seller is legally responsible, as a partner of the buyer, for
active cases, there will be the important additional assurance that
the seller will use care in selecting a buyer. Third, the seller may
improperly withdraw from her retainer and make herself unavaila-
ble to future clients. The Model Code arguably prohibits with-
drawal without good cause. The Rules permit Withdrawal if there is
no material injury to the client. In neither the Code nor the Rules
is there an explicit prohibition on reasonable covenants not to
compete associated with the sale of a law practice. Such a prohibi-
tion should not be inferred.
IV. THE BUYER
A. Solicitation
The buyer of a law practice can be characterized as paying for
referrals. He is soliciting clients-a practice that in the past vio-
lated traditional canons of ethics. Authorities believed that solici-
101. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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tation in this manner was undignified and too commercial. 10 2 Re-
cent developments in constitutional law have led to amendments
to both the Model Code and the Model Rules and relaxed the re-
strictions on what a lawyer may communicate to potential clients.
In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,"°3 the Supreme Court held that a
state could not prohibit non-misleading communications merely
because they were commercially motivated; the attorney had a
right to speak, and the client had a right to be informed. Moreover,
such commercially motivated communications might enhance the
proper allocation of legal services.
The Model Code has become a hodge-podge of rules trying to
draw the line between proper and improper communications. Each
state has adopted a different formula. In light of In re R.M.J.,
where the Supreme Court struck down restrictions on lawyer ad-
vertising as a violation of attorneys' first amendment rights, it is
doubtful that any of these formulations are constitutional. The
Model Rules wipe the slate clean. Simply put, "a lawyer shall not
make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the
lawyer's services."'
10 5
The buyer and seller of a law practice are now free to engage
in commercially motivated communications. In so doing, Bates re-
quires the buyer and seller to make non-false and non-misleading
statements to their clients. The seller's clients should be apprised
of the situation and of their alternatives. Moreover, to permit
truthful, commercially motivated speech will reinforce the involved
lawyers' duties to assist the clients of a retiring lawyer.
In Bates, the Supreme Court stated that a state could place
legitimate "time, place, and manner"'01 6 restrictions on commercial
102. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
103. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
104. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
105. The Model Rules provide:
A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer
or the lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it:
(a) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact nec-
essary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;
(b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can
achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; or
(c) compares the lawyer's services with other lawyer's services, unless com-
parison can be factually substantiated.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 (1983).
106. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384 (1977).
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speech. In In re R.M.J.,' 07 the Court qualified this statement, say-
ing, "[t]he State must assert a substantial interest and the inter-
ference with speech must be in proportion to the interest served.
Restrictions must be narrowly drawn, and the State lawfully may
regulate only to the extent regulation furthers the State's substan-
tial interest."10 8
In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,"9 the Supreme
Court faced a classic, in-person, ambulance-chasing case. The
Court held that the state could prohibit this mode of solicitation
because it had a legitimate interest in preventing "fraud, undue
influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of 'vexatious
conduct,'" including invasion of the potential clients' privacy.110
The soliciting lawyer could choose his would-be clients with care.
He might visit only those most susceptible, either because of their
situation or their capabilities. The lawyer might force this meeting
on the would-be client. The face-to-face meeting would permit the
lawyer to use all his persuasive skills to convince the would-be cli-
ent to retain him, and the would-be client would not have an op-
portunity to reflect. As a result, he might well be pressured into an
immediate decision. Because an in-person solicitation would be in-
volved, the content of the meeting would not be subject to the
same scrutiny as it would be if the solicitation were a writing.
In the sale of a law practice a truthful letter by the seller or
the buyer does not invade the privacy interest of a client. The let-
ters are channeled to the seller's clients under the auspices of the
seller. Clients expect communications from their lawyers. A retir-
ing lawyer does not invade a client's privacy by telling him that
she wishes to retire and that she recommends that the buyer con-
tinue the client's work. In some circumstances, even the Model
Code does not characterize commercially motivated speech di-
rected to current or former clients as being unprofessional. 1' This
107. 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
108. Id. at 203 (citations omitted).
109. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
110. Id. at 462; see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 7.2 legal back-
ground (Proposed Final Draft 1981) (advertising guidelines for attorneys).
111. The Model Code provides:
(A) a lawyer who has given in-person unsolicited advice to a layperson that he
should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment resulting
from that advice, except that: (1) A lawyer may accept employment by a close
friend, relative, former client (if the advice is germane to the former employ-
ment), or one whom the lawyer reasonably believes to be a client.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILrrY DR 2-104 (1969) (footnotes omitted); see also
id. at DR 2-102(A)(2) (professional announcement cards for change of association or address
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is also true under the Model Rules.1 12 The ABA Committee has
stated that in some circumstances, not only is there no invasion of
privacy, but also there is a duty to communicate with one's
client.113
The issue of whether there is substantial potential for unde-
tected fraud and pressure is more difficult. The question can be
analyzed in two ways: first, does the fact that the referral or solici-
tation will be made by letter obviate concerns of undue pressure or
undetected fraud; second, is the fact that the letter will be written
to a target group, the seller's clients, significant?
1 4
Disciplinary Rule 2-104(A) of the Model Code proscribes "in-
person unsolicited advice to a layperson that he should obtain
counsel" without indicating whether a written letter of solicitation
would be "in-person unsolicited advice." ' Model Rule 7.3 clarifies
the ambiguity. Even if pecuniary gain is a significant motive for
solicitation by the lawyer, solicitation by letter is permissible in
certain circumstances.""8 This seems the better result. The chances
for undue pressure are minimal. The recipient will have the chance
to consider the letter and even seek outside assistance in evaluat-
ing it. The recipient will be able to do this at his leisure, without
the pressure of the soliciting lawyer's presence. In In re Koffler,
117
the court held that such direct mail advertising was constitution-
ally protected speech. The court stated: "To outlaw the use of let-
allowed with minimal biographical data, excluding the nature of the practice).
112. The Model Rules provide:
A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospective client with
whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, by mail, in-
person or otherwise, when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the
lawyer's pecuniary gain. The term "solicit" includes contact in-person, by tele-
phone or telegraph, by letter or other writing, or by other communication di-
rected to a specific recipient, but does not include letters addressed or advertis-
ing circulars distributed generally to persons not known to need legal services of
the kind provided by the lawyer in a particular matter, but who are so situated
that they might in general find such services useful.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1983).
113. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 210 & 213
(1941).
114. See generally Comment, Attorney Direct Mail Communication: The Koffler Com-
mercial Speech Approach, 4 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 397 (1981) (discussing letter solicitation
use by various law firms).
115. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104(A) (1969); see supra note
111.
116. It is at least arguable, in some cases, that neither the seller nor the buyer will have
significant gain as a motive. They may be acting to protect the seller's clients. See In re
Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
117. 51 N.Y.2d 140, 412 N.E.2d 927, 433 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1980).
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ters . . . addressed to those most likely to be in need of legal ser-
vices . . . ignores the strong societal and individual interest in the
free dissemination of truthful price information as a means of as-
suring informed and reliable decision making in our free enterprise
system . ... "I"
The Model Rules, however, prohibit direct mailings to certain
groups. The Model Rules prohibit the seller from directing her
mailing to a specific recipient, but sanction "distributing generally
to persons not known to need legal services of the kind provided
by the lawyer in a particular matter, but who are so situated that
they might in general find such services useful.""' The distinction
is a fine one. The purpose of the Model Rules is to fashion a nar-
row rule that will protect the group that will be most vulnerable at
the time of mailing. 20 Illustrative of this vulnerable category is the
group targeted in In re Frank,'2' in which the attorney improperly
sent solicitation letters to twenty persons charged with driving
under the influence of alcohol and for whom no attorney had en-
tered an appearance. 
22
A seller's clients are not in need of such protection. 123 As a
group, they have no immediate, pressing reason to take legal ac-
tion. The mere fact that their lawyer is going to retire does not
necessarily mean that the client's needs assistance at the moment.
They will have time to reflect on their choice of counsel. Moreover,
because the clients and their legal business will vary in most law
practices, the lawyer will not tailor the letter to individual needs.
Further, it will not refer to particular matters to be litigated and
118. Id. at 146, 412 N.E.2d at 931, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 875-76; see also Spencer v. Honora-
ble Justices, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 579 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (challenging
the constitutionality of DR 2-103(A) and DR 2-104(A)).
119. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1983).
120. The Model Rules provide:
General mailings not speaking to a specific matter do not pose the same
danger of abuse as targeted mailings, and therefore are not prohibited by this
Rule. The representations made in such mailings are necessarily general rather
than tailored, less importuning than informative. They are addressed to recipi-
ents unlikely to be specifically vulnerable at the time, hence who are likely to be
more skeptical about unsubstantiated claims. General mailings not addressed to
recipients involved in a specific legal matter or incident, therefore, more closely
resemble permissible advertising rather than prohibited solicitation.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 Comment (1983).
121. 440 N.E.2d 676 (Ind. 1982).
122. Id.
123. But see Adler v. Epstein, 482 Pa. 416, 393 A.2d 1175 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
907 (1979); Note, Attorneys-Law Firm May Obtain Injunction Barring Solicitation of Cli-
ents By Former Salaried Associates, 24 VILL. L. REV. 770, 781-82 (1978-79).
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will be more general in advising clients of the seller's retirement
and the buyer's availability to continue the work. This generality
will prevent the letter from unduly focusing upon, and thereby
pressuring, particular clients.
There is no unwarranted solicitation when either the seller or
buyer of the seller's law practice writes a letter to the seller's cli-
ents truthfully stating the circumstances and the fact that the bus-
iness is being sold and recommending that the clients continue
their business with the buyer. Both lawyers, as well as their clients,
have an interest in the transmission of non-misleading informa-
tion. This mode of communication will not invade any client's pri-
vacy, nor will it increase the potential for undetected fraud and
pressure.
B. Loyalty to Clients
Because the purchase of a law practice is an expense, it is pos-
sible that the buyer will try to recoup this cost by charging his new
clients too much or by providing them with lower quality service.
Either possibility will harm the client. Yet, both possibilities are
remote. The buyer is a lawyer, obligated by the law to provide legal
services at a reasonable cost.1 24 Additionally, both the Model Code
and the Model Rules require that the lawyer provide competent
service.125 Moreover, the buyer will have the normal business in-
centive to do good-quality, fairly-priced work in order to retain
and attract clients. Moreover, if the buyer makes the purchase in a
lump sum, it is unlikely that he will have any special incentive to
overcharge his clients. Single payments will be like any other fixed
cost of doing business, and there is no reason to believe that this
cost will be treated differently from any other.
The analysis from a business perspective is slightly different if
124. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(A) (1969); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1983).
125. The Model Code provides:
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is
not competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who
is competent to handle it.
(2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the
circumstances.
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101 (1969). The Model Rules provide:
"A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation re-
quires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 (1983).
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the buyer is paying for the business out of future revenues. At a
minimum, the buyer will want to cover these costs through charges
to the clients. Where the variable cost is a percentage of revenue,
however, the cost will be covered no matter what the buyer charges
his clients. Moreover, even where the sales price is fixed, the cost
will not be directly related to any single file, and the buyer is likely
to perceive the seller's share of the revenue as just another cost of
doing business. Nevertheless, both the Model Code and Model
Rules recognize the potential problem, and both require that if
there is to be a fee-split, the total fee should be reasonable. 126
Rather than prohibiting the purchase and sale of a law practice, it
would be better to address directly the issue of unreasonable fees.
Both the Model Code and the Model Rules permit fee-split-
ting between lawyer if the split is made in proportion to the
amount of work that each does. 127 This ensures that each lawyer is
adequately paid for his work, and that neither has an economic
incentive to do his share of the work inadequately. In extreme
cases, such as when the buyer does the work and gets no compen-
sation, there is a disincentive to do capable work. 2 ' There is little
likelihood, however, of any buyer entering into such a contract.
The buyer will certainly get paid something for the work he does.
This is enough to assure the client that the buyer has an economic
incentive to work completely for the client. In fee-splitting cases,
courts and committees never have carefully scrutinized the agreed
allocation of the fee.'
29
The possibility of continued referrals by the seller may also
make the buyer susceptible to undue influence by the seller be-
cause the buyer will want to please the seller. Neither the Model
Code nor the Model Rules addresses this potential problem. Both
permit a fee-split with a retired partner, 30 and a partner is much
more likely to influence her ex-partners than a seller is to influence
a buyer. In the latter case, the parties will not be so close person-
ally. Moreover, both the Model Code and the Model Rules explic-
itly state that a lawyer should not let a third person influence his
126. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107(3) (1979); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e)(3) (1983).
127. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107(2) (1979); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e)(3) (1983).
128. Cf. Corti v. Fleisher, 93 Ill. App. 3d 517, 524, 417 N.E.2d 764, 770 (1981) (Although
this case dealt with referrals, the principle is applicable to the notion of an attorney being
paid for his work.).
129. Hall & Levy, supra note 76.
130. See supra notes 6 & 64.
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judgment."' If the potential for influence is great, however, as it
would be if the seller pays the buyer to finish her cases (which is
one way of characterizing the sale of a law practice), then there
should be disclosure to, and consent by, the clients. The seller's
letter informing her clients of the sale would provide this disclos-
ure. The sale of a law practice need not be prohibited to avoid the
possibility of this limited problem.
C. Misleading Conduct
The buyer of a law practice may wish to acquire the furniture,
books, office address, and telephone number of seller. 132 Most im-
portantly, in some situations, the seller's business name is an im-
portant acquisition. The appearance of continuity assists in devel-
oping new business. 88 This, however, can mislead clients. It is this
potential for misrepresentation that has prompted some commen-
tators to advocate the prohibition of law practice sales.34
The thrust of this article is not to propose a rule that would
permit such misleading conduct. Indeed, the seller still should be
vicariously liable if any person can prove a partnership by estoppel
between the seller and the buyer."3 5 Mere splitting of legal fees will
not create such an estoppel. But, if the seller and buyer have so
mislead existing and future clients as to the nature of their trans-
action that one of these clients legitimately believes that the seller
is still engaged in the buyer's business, then the seller would still
remain liable for all of that client's work. This would be the case in
a "quickie" partnership. The retiring partner would be liable for
131. The Model Code provides: "A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends,
employs, or pays him to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's
professional judgment in rendering such legal services." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITy DR 5-107(B) (1969). Similarly, the Model Rules provide: "A lawyer shall not
permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for
another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal ser-
vices." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(c) (1983).
132. See Sterrett, supra note 1, at 306-07.
133. Cf. Lyon v. Lyon, 246 Cal. App. 2d 519, 54 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1966) (expectation of
future business is personal and confidential and attaches to the individual partners of the
firm, thus, no monetary value can be attributed to it and there is nothing to sell); Siddall v.
Keating, 8 A.D.2d 44, 185 N.Y.S.2d 630, aff'd, 7 N.Y.2d 846, 164 N.E.2d 60 (1959) (goodwill
is not ordinarily attributable to a law partnership); Master v. Brooks, 132 A.D. 874, 117
N.Y.S. 585 (1909) (the right to use the individual name of a partnership is not an element of
goodwill).
134. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Laubenheimer, 113 Wis. 2d 680, 335
N.W.2d 624 (1983).
135. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 16 (1969); Wallenstein, Partnerships-Continued
Liability of a Retiring Partner Receiving Payments, 20 Sw. L.J. 151, 152 (1966).
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the buyer's acts or omissions unless explicit notice was given to
those who might rely on the apparent fact of partnership. Such a
rule would discourage the seller from engaging in or assisting the
buyer in any misleading practices.
Every appearance of continuity, however, will not necessarily
be misleading. For example, a trade name can communicate some-
thing to a business's customers or clients. Depending on its use and
the character of the industry, a tradename may be either helpful or
misleading to the consumer. 36
The use by a partnership of the names of retired lawyers is
equivalent to the use of a trade name.137 Typically, the names of
many law firms do not necessarily identify the practicing partners.
Nevertheless, law firms have traditionally identified themselves by
the names of retired partners. Several committee opinions have
concluded that because it is the nature of the legal profession to
use these names, they are not misleading per se. 3s Although
prohibiting the use of trade names, the Model Code ratifies the
conclusions of these committees and permits the use of the names
of retired partners in the firm name. 139
Although this permissiveness is premised on the belief that
the use of the names of retired lawyers in the firm name is not
misleading, clients can be misled when a partnership transfers its
practice. If Seller and Buyer enter into a partnership, they can
136. In Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a state
could ban the use of trade names by an optometrist. Because the trade name itself has no
intrinsic meaning, the Court said the name can easily be used to mislead consumers. Thus,
to protect consumers, the state could ban the trade name.
137. MODEL RULES OF, PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.5 comment (1983).
138. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 318 (1967); ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1268 (1973).
139. The Model Code provides:
A lawyer in private practice shall not practice under a trade name, a name that
is misleading as to the identity of the lawyer or lawyers practicing under such
name, or a firm name containing names other than those of one or more of the
lawyers in the firm, except that the name of a professional corporation or profes-
sional association may contain "P.C." or "P.A." or similar symbols indicating the
nature of the organization, and if otherwise lawful a firm may use as, or continue
to include in, its name the name or names of one or more deceased or retired
members of the firm or of a predecessor firm in a continuing line of succession. A
lawyer who assumes a judicial, legislative, or public executive or administrative
post or office shall not permit his name to remain in the name of a law firm or to
be used in professional notices of the firm during any significant period in which
he is not actively and regularly practicing law as a member of the firm, and
during such period other members of the firm shall not use his name in the firm
name or in professional notices of the firm.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY DR 2-102(B) (1969) (footnotes omitted).
1985]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
name their new partnership "Seller & Buyer." If Seller then re-
tires, the business can continue as "Seller & Buyer," even though
Buyer remains as the only active practitioner. Arguing that this
should not be permitted in a "quickie" partnership, only begs the
question of what is a "quickie" partnership.
Although the Model Code prohibits their use, trade names are
not necessarily misleading. A solo practitioner, in fact, may prac-
tice under the name of "ABC Legal Clinic." The clinic, in all of its
several branches, may have a particular quality and cost of work
associated with its name. The clients may not know, or care, who
the practicing lawyer is, as long as they get the same quality and
cost that they have come to associate with the "ABC Legal Clinic."
In such a case, as long as the successor continued the quality and
cost of work associated with the name, it would not be misleading
to permit a successor to use the name "ABC Legal Clinic." Al-
though some cases recently have relaxed its restrictiveness, a literal
reading of the Model Code would prohibit such use. In In re Shan-
non, 40 the court found that although the name "Shannon and
Johnson's Hollywood Law Center" was a trade name for some pur-
poses, it was not a trade name as defined by the Model Code be-
cause, under the facts of the case, it was not misleading.
The Model Rules permit trade names that are not mislead-
ing.' The Model Rules recognize that such trade names are con-
ceptually no different for traditional law firm names that include
the names of retired partners and that a particular trade name
may communicate something of value to clients. Because the
Model Rules permit the use of a non-misleading trade name by a
solo practitioner, there should be nothing impermissible per se in
the transfer of the trade name incident to the sale of the practice.
It should depend on whether the use of the firm name was, in fact,
misleading.
Using the retiring lawyer's name in the successor firm as part
and parcel to the "quickie" partnership method of transferring a
140. In re Shannon, 292 Or. 339, 638 P.2d 482 (1982); see also Florida Bar v. Fet-
terman, 439 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1983). But see In re Oldtowne Legal Clinic, 285 Md. 132, 400
A.2d 1111 (1979).
141. The Model Rules provide:
A lawyer shall not use a firm name, letterhead or other professional designa-
tion that violates rule 7.1. A trade name may be used by a lawyer in private
practice if it does not imply a connection with a government agency or with a
public or charitable legal services organization and is not otherwise in violation
of rule 7.1.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.5(a) (1983).
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law practice is deceptive and misleading. It would be better to per-
mit the sale of a law practice, and if not misleading, then also per-
mit the concurrent sale of the firm's name. This method of trans-
fer, coupled with the seller's letter advising her clients of the sale
of her practice, would better protect and assist clients.
D. Summary
The buyer of a solo law practice faces three major ethical con-
cerns. First, he may be soliciting clients. The Model Rules permit
the writing of solicitation letters to both clients and to a class of
addressees that are not too specific and vulnerable. This is consis-
tent with constitutional standards and modern policy considera-
tions. Second, the buyer may be subject to influences that would
not be in the best interest of his new clients. The buyer may be
concerned with the costs of having acquired the business, and he
may therefore improperly overcharge or cut services. The Model
Rules suggest that the buyer or seller should disclose these con-
cerns to the clients, thus giving them an opportunity to consent.
Third, there is the chance that the buyer will mislead clients with
respect to the seller's involvement in the new business. The Model
Rules suggest that it is unwise to mandate a per se prohibition in
the trade name context. Only if the acquired name is misleading in
practice should it be prohibited. The same reasoning should apply
to the sale of a law practice. The mere possibility that the buyer
might mislead future clients is not sufficient reason to prohibit the
sale of the practice.
V. CONCLUSION
Traditionally, many authorities asserted that the sale of a law
practice as a going concern was too commercial and too undigni-
fied. The rhetoric of the New York County Lawyers' Association
Opinion #109 captures the mood: "Clients are not merchandise.
Lawyers are not tradesmen. They have noting to sell but personal
service. An attempt, therefore, to barter in clients, would appear to
be inconsistent with the best concepts of our professional sta-
tus." 42 When asked about fee-splitting, Chairman Drinker, an au-
thority on legal ethics, stated:
It makes the law too much of a business if you are practicing the
way you would as a broker. The lawyer is not supposed to get
142. New York County Lawyer's Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 109 (1943).
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paid for anything but the legal services that he renders, and sell-
ing a man a client is not a legal service. I think it is beneath the
dignity of the profession to take money for something that is not
a legal service. 43
It is increasingly obvious, though, that a law practice is com-
mercial. It is big business. In 1983, the Department of Commerce
estimated legal service receipts at $38.5 billion. " The trade jour-
nals continually emphasize the most efficient and business-like way
to manage a practice. The Supreme Court recognizes this reality.
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,"5 the Court found certain mini-
mum fee schedules violative of the antitrust laws. The court
stated: "In the modern world it cannot be denied that the activi-
ties of lawyers play an important part in commercial intercourse,
and that anticompetitive activities by lawyers may exert a restraint
on commerce."'
14 6
The concept that it is beneath a lawyer's dignity to sell her
practice probably reflects the attitudes of a past generation. There
is nothing suspect about wanting to profit reasonably from a law
practice. In Bates, the Supreme Court held that, in spite of the
fact that the advertising was commercial speech, certain state
prohibitions on lawyer advertising were violative of the first
amendment."17 The Court said:
But we find the postulated connection between advertising and
the erosion of true professionalism to be severely strained. At its
core, the argument presumes that attorneys must conceal from
themselves and from their clients the real-life fact that lawyers
earn their livelihood at the bar. We suspect that few attorneys
engage in such self-deception.
48
Concepts such as "dignified" too often reflect the observer's
subjective attitudes. In the sale of a law practice, a critic, reflecting
his particular attitudes about commercialism, can always assert
that the transaction is "undignified."
The law ought to reflect commercial realities and not be held
hostage to narrow, dated business views. The prohibition on the
sale of a law practice denies commercial realities. It is important to
143. A Panel Discussion, supra note 78, at 434 (former chairman of the Standing Com-
mittee on Professional Ethics and Grievances discussing the "five percent" practice).
144. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 1984 U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 52-22.
145. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
146. Id. at 788.
147. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977).
148. Id. at 368.
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discern the values and interest that a given rule affects. The cur-
rent prohibition on the sale of a law practice not only invites de-
ception but also denies the values and interests inherent in the
Model Rules. Subject to the restrictions stated previously, that
protect the client as well as the buyer and seller, the solo practi-
tioner ought to be able to sell her law practice as a going concern.
